LABOR LAWPROPRIATE

REMEDIES -DECLARATORY
RELIEF

IN A

JUDGMENT IS

NON-ARBITRABLE

§ 301

AP-

LABOR

DISPUTE CONCERNING A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
WITH A NO-STRIKE CLAUSE, Bituminous Coal Operators'

Association v. International Union, United Mine Workers, 585

F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1978).
The 1974 collective bargaining negotiations between the
Bituminous Coal Operators' Association' (BCOA) and the International Union of the United Mine Workers of America 2 (International)
culminated in the signing of the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement of 1974 (Agreement) on December 6.3 As the date approached for the implementation of an article creating a new union
position, 4 the parties manifested total disagreement concerning the
tasks to be allocated to the new category. 5 The controversy resulted

1 Brief for Appellant at 4, Bituminous Coal Operators' Ass'n v. International Union, UMW,
585 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant]. BCOA is the sole bargaining agent for management of companies whose unions are represented by the UMW. Id.
The National Labor Relations Act recognizes this multi-employer bargaining unit and empowers
it to negotiate national wage agreements and to interpret contract provisions under its own
constitution and by-laws. Id. at 4-5. From its inception in 1950, BCOA has negotiated agreements between the member mine owners and the UMW. Brief for Appellee InternationalUnion, United Mine Workers of America at 3, BCOA v. UMW, 585 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee UMW].
2 Brief for Appellee UMW, supra note 1, at 3. The UMW is the sole collective bargaining
agent for employees of companies represented by BCOA. Id. The governmental structure is
three-tiered, with the powers of each level strictly limited by the UMW constitution. Id. Members at a particular mine location comprise "the grass roots level." Id. at 3. Although unable to
adopt laws in conflict with the International or the district in which they are located, the local
unions are essentially self-governing bodies. Id.
The district unions, in the middle tier of authority, are also situated in the coal fields. Id.
at 4. District autonomy is limited only by required compliance with the rulings of the International Executive Board of the International (IEB), the third tier. Id. at 5.
Located in Washington, D.C., the IEB and the International President steer the International through its routine daily operations. Id. Neither has authority to discipline any member,
and before action is initiated "against any International, District, or Local officer, ...
a full
panoply of due process standards must be observed." Id. at 5-6.
3 BCOA v. UMW, 431 F. Supp. 774, 776 (W.D. Pa. 1977), remanded, 585 F.2d 586 (3d
Cir. 1978).
4 Under the 1974 Agreement, the roof bolter's helper was to assist in the operation of
continuous mining machines and roof bolting machines. Brief for Appellee International Union,
United Mine Workers at 3, Consolidation Coal Co. v. International Union, UMW,
Buckeye Coal Co. v. International Union, UMW, District 4, UMW, and Local 6290, UMW,
585 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee District 4].
5 Consolidation Coal Co. v. UMW, 431 F. Supp. 787, 793 (W.D. Pa. 1977), remanded,
585 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1978); Brief for Appellee District 4, supra note 4, at 3. The union had
anticipated that the creation of this new position would increase the total number of employee
positions. Id. However, the company added to the workload of roof bolter's helper tasks previ-
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in widespread picketing and wildcat strikes, 6 shutting down mines in
7
eastern Ohio, northern West Virginia, and western Pennsylvania.
These work stoppages contravened the 1974 Agreement provisions to maintain the integrity of the contract, 8 and to utilize the
extensive grievance-arbitration procedure to peacefully resolve all
local disputes. 9 The collective bargaining process was the contractually designated vehicle for resolution of disputes national in character.1 0
Wildcat strikes commenced on March 7, 1975.11 It was not until
six weeks later that all mines returned to full operation, as a result of
the mine owners' acquiescence to the union demands. 12 These union
ously accomplished by other classifications, and was thus able to fill the roof bolter's helper
position by eliminating the other positions. id.
6 Brief for Appellee District 4, supra note 4, at 4. The union safety committee certified
this reclassification as imminently dangerous and consequently the mine crews refused to work.
id.
7 431 F. Supp. at 788. The strike spread as additional mines posted imminent danger
notices and striking miners engaged in stranger picketing. Brief for Appellee District 4, supra
note 4, at 4.
During 1974 and the first five months of 1975, 880 UMW strikes followed a similar pattern.
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 10, BCOA v. UMW, 585 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1978) [hereinafter
cited as Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants]. These wildcat strikes lasted from one day to several
weeks. Id. Some of the alleged points of contention pertained to the participation of salaried
employees in classified work, non-posting of overtime sheets, staggered vacations, job assignments and job bidding. Id.
8 2 Joint Appendix to Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants [hereinafter cited as 2 JA] at 63. The
clause does not specifically mention "'no-strike," merely "maint[enance oflthe integrity of...
[the] contract." Id. For a full discussion of the controversy concerning this implied no-strike
clause, see notes 101-04 infra and accompanying text.
9 585 F.2d at 589. Article XXIII, section c of the 1974 Agreement states:
Should differences arise between the Mine Workers and the Employer as to meaning and application of the provisions of this Agreement, or should differences arise
about matters not specifically mentioned in this Agreement, or should any local
trouble of any kind arise at the mine, an earnest effort shall be made to settle such
differences at the earliest practicable time.
2 JA, supra note 8, at 55. This statement of intent preambles the grievance-arbitration procedure which delineates the five levels of settlement, each subsequent level reviewing the decision reached at the prior level. 2 JA, supra note 8, at 53-60. The employee first submits the
complaint to the foreman. Id. at 55. The decision is then appealable to a joint committee of
management and elected employees (Mine Committee). Id. at 56. A district representative and
an employer representative comprise the next level of appeal. Id. A panel arbitrator will review
any solution unsatisfactory to either party at a district hearing. Id. at 57. The ultimate decision
emanates from the Arbitration Review Board. Id. One BCOA-elected representative, one
UMW-elected representative, and one jointly-elected umpire form the Arbitration Review
Board. Id. at 54. Unless appealed, the decisions at each tier are final and binding on both
parties. Id. at 59.
50 585 F.2d at 589; 2 JA, supra note 8, at 63.
11 Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 7, at 12.
12 Id. at 13-14. The underlying instigation for the reopening of the mines was in dispute.
Brief for Appellee District 4, supra note 4, at 4-6; Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 7,
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activities adversely affected thousands of employees, 13 costing
4
$76,000,000 in lost wages and 116,500,000 tons in lost production.'
The disruptions reflected the historical inability of these two bargain5
ing groups to peacefully resolve their conflicts.'
BCOA filed a complaint against the UMW International in the
United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania. 16 Pursuant to section 301 of the Labor-Management
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley), 17 the mine owners group sought a declaratory judgment 18 that the union had breached the 1974 Agree-

at 12-14. The International appointed a commission to operate within the strike area. Brief for
Appellee District 4, supra note 4, at 4. The stated purpose of the commission was to expedite
negotiation between the employers, the mine committees and the health and safety committees
pending the results of arbitration. Id. at 4-5. The UMW position was that the efforts of the
commission resolved the controversy over the roof bolter's helper with the resultant termination
of the work stoppages. Id. at 5-6.
The mine owners alleged that the commission refused to submit to arbitration and that the
commission in fact exhorted the strikers by seeking unemployment and welfare payments for
them. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 7, at 13. Employer submission to union demands was, according to the owners, the sole impetus for the mine re-openings. Id. at 13-14.
13 Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 7, at 13.
14 585 F.2d at 590.
15 Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 7-8. In the five year period prior to the filing of this
complaint, wildcat strikes caused more than 4,500,000 lost work days at BCOA mines. Id. at 7.
Concomitant losses were $219,379,000 lost wages, $50,446,000 lost pension and trust funds, and
63,562,000 tons lost production. Id. at 8.
The United States district courts in the areas of the bituminous coal fields in 1975 were
flooded with suits similar to the ones under discussion. 431 F. Supp. at 778. Most of these
strikes arose in utter disregard of contactual arbitration procedures. Id.
The work stoppages had been escalating steadily: 516,000 work days lost in 1972; 529,000
days lost in 1973; 1,006,000 days lost in 1974; 1,368,000 davs lost from January 1, 1975 to
September 16, 1975. Complaint at 6, BCOA v. UMW, 431 F. Supp. 774 (W.D. Pa. 1977),
remanded, 585 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1978). The union undertakings in the current 1978 contract
show no substantial departure from those in the 1974 Agreement; consequently there is no
compelling argument that the trend will reverse itself. 585 F.2d at 599.
'6 431 F. Supp. at 774; Brief for Appellee UMW, supra note 1, at 9.
17 Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
The pertinent portions provide that:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter . . .
may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Id.
18 Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 8-9; Brief for Appellee UMW, supra note 1, at
9-10.
The Declaratory Judgments Act provides in pertinent part:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United
States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other
legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not
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ment.' 9 The complaint averred that the International had failed to
take positive action to assure contract compliance and to prevent illegal strikes and picketing. 20 In addition, BCOA sought injunctive
relief to compel the International to undertake a vigorous program of
encouraging and educating the local unions to comply with the 1974
Agreement.21
22
Five mine owners represented by BCOA in the Agreement
filed separate section 301 Taft-Hartley complaints in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. 23 The
individual actions sought equitable relief and money damages 24
against both the International and the local unions participating in the
wildcat strikes and picketing. 2 5 The owners alleged a deliberate attempt to circumvent the grievance-arbitration procedure of the
26
Agreement.
The district court opinions recognized that the actions of the
UMW breached the 1974 Agreement. 2 7 However, Judge Weber
considered the relief sought beyond the power of the court and

further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and
effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.
28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976).
t' Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 8-9; Brief for Appellee UMW, supra note 1, at
9-10.
20 Id.
21 Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 9; Brief for Appellee UMW, supra note 1, at 10. The
specific actions demanded by BCOA from the International included: (1) instruction of members
that the 1974 Agreement prohibited strikes and picketing over arbitrable issues and prohibited
refusal to cross these picket lines; (2) discipline of non-compliant members; (3) refusal to defend
non-compliant members, local unions, and districts; (4) condemnation of stranger picketing; and
(5) suspension of automony of non-compliant local or district unions. Brief for Appellant, supra
note 1, at 9.
22 The owners were Consolidation Coal Company, North American Coal Corporation, The
Valley Camp Coal Company, The Pittson Company, and The Buckeye Coal Company. Brief for
Appellee District 4, supra note 4, at cover. The court heard the Buckeye case separately and
entered Civil Action No. 75-447 on May 25, 1977. 585 F.2d at 589 n.1.
2 Consolidation Coal Co. v. UMW, 431 F. Supp. 787 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
24 Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 7, at 3. Several companies continued to experience wildcat strikes concerning the roof bolter's helper, due to the union's dissatisfaction with
the arbitrator's decision. Id. at 4. In an attempt to prevent further strikes, the companies submitted a prayer for a prospective injunction against work stoppages concerning this issue. Id.
However, the owners withdrew this prayer after the evidentiary hearing in an attempt to avoid
invocation of the injunction prohibition of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§101-115
(1976). Id.
" 585 F.2d at 597; Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 7, at 3; Brief for Appellee
District 4, supra note 4, at 6-7.
26 585 F.2d at 597.

27 431 F. Supp. 774, 786; 431 F. Supp. 787, 793.
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granted the International's motion to dismiss.2 8 BCOA and the five
individual owners appealed the ruling to the United States Court of
29
Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Judge Gibbons authored the opinion for the court of appeals in
BCOA v. UMW, 30 holding that certain requirements of the NorrisLaGuardia Act barred injunctive relief sought by BCOA against the
International. 3 I However, neither the equitable relief requested by
the individual mine owners against the International nor the declaratory relief sought by BCOA suffered from the same infirmities. 32 The
latter two issues were remanded to the district court for reconsider33
ation in light of the principles delineated by the court of appeals.
The propriety of an injunction to restrain union activity in a labor
dispute has been a controversial topic for over a century. 34 Until the
inception of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, federal courts freely granted
injunctions to employers who sought to restrain activities of the
young labor movement. 35 Whether the substantive law was valid or
clear mattered little because once the momentum of a strike was
halted, it could rarely be regained. 3 6 The injunction clearly was of
great benefit to the employer group and of great detriment to the
37
struggling labor groups.

28 431 F. Supp. 774, 786; 431 F. Supp. 787, 793. The court determined that injunctive and

declaratory relief would violate the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 431

F. Supp. 774, 784, and would be difficult to formulate and enforce. Id. The opinion did note,
however, that the
troublesome [aspect of the case] is that UMWA enjoys the ease of bargaining with
BCOA alone, in behalf of its members, but vet seeks not to be bound to BCOA
when BCOA attempts to enforce the contract in behalf of the same members.
Id. at 787.
29 585 F.2d at 589.

30 Id.
" Id. at 594. See notes 178-94 infra and accompanying text.

32 585 F.2d at 595, 599.
33 Id. at 597, 599. A tangential issue was whether or not the BCOA claims were mooted
because the 1974 Agreement had been duly succeeded by the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement of 1978, Id. at 599. Judge Gibbons ruled out mootness, finding that the new agree-

ment would not prevent the recurring wildcat strikes. Id.
' F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 1 (1930); see also In re Debs,
158 U.S. 564 (1895) and discussion of Debs in FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra at 18-20.
31 C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW at 7-8 (1971). The life-tenured federal

judiciary appeared to be less sympathetic to the plight of the common man than the state judiciary.
Id. For a discussion of the early abuses of the labor injunction, see B. TAYLOR & F. WITNEY,
LABOR RELATIONS Lw at 31-36 (2d ed. 1975).
36 MORRIS, supra note 35, at 7; TAYLOR & WITNEY, supra note 35, at 33.
37 MORRIS, supra note 35, at 7; TAYLOR & WITNEY, supra note 35, at 23, 31-34. A temporary restraining order proposed merely to maintain the status quo between the parties. Id. at
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Federal legislation provided no guidelines 3 8 and the courts were
finding it increasingly difficult to discriminate between a tolerable
labor activity and an intolerable one. 39 The inability of the federal
judicial system to cope with the multifarious problems of modern
labor became increasingly obvious. 4 0 By the 1930's, it was apparent
that only a national federal labor policy crafted by Congress could
4l
provide relief.
The disastrous effects of the Great Depression exacerbated the
plight of the American worker. 42 Because the inequality between
business and the individual laborer had never been so patent, 4 3 labor
accelerated its efforts to control use of the injunction through state
4
and federal legislation. "
In 1927 Congress began debate on a bill 4 5 that was later to be
known as the Norris-LaGuardia Federal Anti-Injunction Act. 4 6 When
the bill became law five years later, 47 it dramatically changed the
balance of power in American labor-management relations. 48 The
Norris-LaGuardia Act strengthened the bargaining position of labor
by curbing the power of the federal judiciary to interfere in labor
disputes. 4 9 The courts no longer had jurisdiction to issue injunctions
against certain activities by participants or interested parties in cases
"involving or growing out of any labor dispute." 50 The legislation
specifically enumerated in section 4 the protected activities, 5 1 which

32-33. In a labor dispute, however, the state of suspended animation had a myriad of effects.

Attention of labor leaders turned to the court room; public opinion arose against the strikers;
union members became confused and afraid. Id. at 33. See generally FRANKFURTER & GREENE,
supra note 34.
38 TAYLOR & WITNEY, supra note 35, at 31.
39 MORRIS, supra note 35, at 7; TAYLOR & WITNEY, supra note 35, at 31. No jury was
present at injunction proceedings, and the judiciary's only guides were "their own social and

economic predilections." Id.
40 MORRIS, supra note 35, at 7.
41 MORRIS, supra note 35, at 7-10.
42 TAYLOR & WITNEY, supra note 35, at 70.
"' Id. at 70-71. Working groups increasingly identified their burdens as outgrowths of big
business and its requisite competitive system. Id.
44 Id. The American Federation of Labor spearheaded a vigorous state and national cam-

paign to curtail the use of the dreaded injunction. Id.
45 Id. at 80.
46 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976). For a detailed discussion of the inception of this legislation, see
FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 34, at 205-28.

47 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). The date of passage was March 23, 1932. Id.
48 MORRIS, supra note 35, at 22; TAYLOR & WITNEY, supra note 35, at 80.
49 MORRIS, supra note 35, at 22; TAYLOR & WITNEY, supra note 35, at 81.
50 Norris-LaGuardia § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976).

Id. Section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia provides:
I'
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
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included not only direct aid or involvement in work stoppages, 52 but
also auxiliary efforts to advise or induce anyone to engage in a work
53
stoppage.
Section 9 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act granted further protection
by its mandate for a court hearing prior to the issuance of any injunction concerning labor dispute activities not protected by section 4.54
Both the complaint for the hearing and any injunction resulting therefrom must be phrased with the clearest specificity. 55 This precision

order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of
any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in
such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in
concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment;
(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or of any
employer organization, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as is described in section 103 of this title;
(c) Paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person participating or interested in such labor dispute, any strike or unemployment benefits or insurance,
or other moneys or things of value;
(d) By all lawful means aiding any person participating or interested in any
labor dispute who is being proceeded against in, or is prosecuting, any action or
suit in any court of the United States or of any State;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor
dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not
involving fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their interests in a labor dispute;
(g) Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do any of the acts heretofore specified;
(h) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the acts heretofore
specified; and
(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or violence
the acts heretofore specified, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as is
described in section 103 of this title.
Id. See FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 34, at 214-16.
52 Norris-LaGuardia § 4(a)-(f), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (a)-(f) (1976). See note 51 supra.
4
5- Norris-LaGuardia § (g)-(i), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (g)-(i) (1976). See note 51 supra.
54 Norris-LaGuardia § 9 reads:
No restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction shall be granted in
a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except on the basis of findings of
fact made and filed by the court in the record of the case prior to the issuance of
such restraining order or injunction; and every restraining order or injunction
granted in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute shall include only a
prohibition of such specific act or acts as may be expressly complained of in the bill
of complaint or petition filed in such case and as shall be expressly included in said
findings of fact made and filed by the court as provided in this chapter.
Id.
55

Id.
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eliminates the possibility of a blanket injunction, prohibiting legal as
56
well as illegal acts.
57
The Norris-LaGuardia Act's broad definition of "labor dispute"
established the wide scope of the Act. 58 A labor dispute "include[d]
any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, ...
regardless of whether or not the disputants [stood] in the proximate
relation of employer and employee." 59 A case that involved a labor
dispute was merely a case that "involve[d] persons who are engaged
in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation." 6 0 "The allowable
area of economic conflict" 6 1 was concomitant with the realities of
modern collective bargaining. A union frequently exerted pressure on
an industry-wide basis in order to achieve its goals. 62 The NorrisLaGuardia Act legitimated this activity and sheltered it from a federal
injunction. 63
The Supreme Court fully approved Norris-LaGuardia 64 and
twenty-five states subsequently enacted state anti-injunction legislation. 65 This federal legislation shielded the nascent labor movement
from judicial interference with activation of their economic
weapons. 66 The Wagner Act, passed by Congress in 1935, buttressed the effect of Norris-LaGuardia by giving workers the right to
67
organize, to bargain collectively, and to utilize economic self-help.
Along with the narrowed federal jurisdiction under Norris-LaGuardia,
these three rights under the Wagner Act gave the American labor
movement the power and freedom necessary to become the " 'the

56 TAYLOR & WITNEY, supra note 35, at 88.
51 Norris-LaGuardia § 13(c), 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1976).
58 TAYLOR & WITNEY, supra note 35, at 84.

59 Norris-LaGuardia § 13(c), 29 U.S.C.
60 Norris-LaGuardia § 13(a), 29 U.S.C.

§
§

113(c) (1976).
113(a) (1976).

61 FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 34, at 1.
6 Id. at 216-17. This provision highlighted the "interdependence" of the American crafts,

"[tihe economic bond that unites in interest all who earn their livelihood by any of the processes of fabrication and distribution of a single commodity, or of related commodities, or of commodities industrially dependent upon one another ..
." Id. at 216.
63 TAYLOR & WITNEY, supra note 35, at 84-85.

64 Id. at 96. Perhaps the Court found it impossible to ignore prevailing social thought. id. at
98. See Lauf v. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938) (dissolving injunction against parties not in
proximate relationship of employer-employee); Seen v. Tile Layers, 301 U.S. 468 (1937) (upholding validity of Wisconsin anti-injunction legislation similar to Norris-LaGuardia).
65 TAYLOR & WITNEY, supra note 35, at 96. These state laws are referred to as "little"
Norris-LaGuardia Acts. Id. at 98.
66 MoRIRs, supra note 35, at 25.

67 National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C.
note 35, at 28.

§§

151-152 (1976); MoRRIs, supra
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largest, the most powerful, and the most aggressive that the world

ha[d] ever seen.'"

68

As unions prospered, problems developed 6 9 as a result of management's inability to enforce its collective bargaining agreements.7"
The organized workers frequently resorted to picketing and strikes,
many of which ended in tragedy and bitterness. 7 1 Some of these
work stoppages occurred in the face of explicit no-strike clauses in
72
collective bargaining agreements.
By 1947 public interest had shifted from protecting labor's right
to organize and engage in concerted activity to restricting union activities and enforcing collective bargaining agreements. 73 The election issues of 1946 centered around possible amendments to the
Wagner Act that would compel union compliance to its contracts with
employers. 7 4 Fashioned from the many bills introduced in
Congress 75 and passed over President Truman's veto, 7 6 the Taft-

68 MoRis, supra note 35, at 35. Between 1935 and 1947, union membership increased

from 3 to 15 million. Id. Union enrollment in some industries approached 80% of the available
work force. Id. Labor leaders assumed positions of power and importance. Id. For a discussion
of the shortcomings of the Wagner Act, see id. at 30-34.
69 Id. at 37. Secondary boycotts injured many groups who, because they were not parties to
a contract, were powerless to give the unions any relief. Id. Closed and union shops were often
abused. Id. Jurisdictional disputes among the unions themselves caused many long work stoppages in the construction industry. Id.
70 Id. at 442. The one-sided Wagner Act bestowed rights upon labor unions but relegated to
labor none of the accompanying responsibilities. Id. There was not even a mandate to comply
with the contracts they negotiated. Id. Additionally, unions were not considered legal entities
and thus could not be sued in a contract action. Id.
71 Id. at 37. Strike activity during World War II was minimal, TAYLOR & WrrNEY, supra
note 35, at 205, perhaps due to the passage of the Smith-Connally War Labor Disputes Act, 50
U.S.C. §§ 1501-1511 (1976). Mosuus, supra note 35, at 32. This legislation placed heavy procedural requirements on legal strikes and heavy penalties on illegal strikes. Id. The notable
exceptions to the peacetime hiatus were the bitter United Mine Worker coal strikes led by John
L. Lewis in 1943. TAYLOR & WITNEY, supra note 35, at 205. These events probably precipitated the passage of the Smith-Connally Act. Moms, supra note 35, at 32. In 1946, however,
with the war over, the country encountered its worst strike problem to date with 1.43 percent
of working time lost (compared to .47 percent the previous year). TAYLOR & WI'rNEY, supra
note 35, at 211. See id. for further discussion of the social climate of 1946.
72 MouIus, supra note 35, at 32, 36.
73 Id. at 40, 442; Note, Prospective Boys Market Injunctions, 90 HARV. L. REv. 790, 792
(1977).
74 MoRaus, supra note 35, at 35-36.
75 Id. at 36.
76 Id. at 39. When President Truman vetoed the bill, he stated:
The bill taken as a whole would reverse the basic direction of our national labor
policy, inject the Government into private economic affairs on an unprecedented
scale, and conflict with important principles of our democratic society. Its provisions
would cause more strikes, not fewer. It would contribute neither to industrial peace
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Hartley amendments to the Labor-Management Relations Act 7 7 became the law of the land on August 22, 1947.78
An important goal of this legislation was the enforcement of nostrike clauses in collective bargaining agreements. 79 Section 301
gave federal district courts jurisdiction over "[s]uits for violation of
contracts between an employer and a labor organization . . . affecting
commerce." 80 However, Taft-Hartley did not repeal the antiinjunction provisions of Norris-LaGuardia." l Conflict arose when
section 301 of the Taft-Hartley amendments was juxtaposed to section
101 of Norris-LaGuardia. The latter prohibited federal courts from
issuing injunctions in labor disputes, while the former endowed federal courts with jurisdiction in cases involving violations of collective
bargaining agreements. Attempts to harmonize one with the other
resulted in much litigation 8 2 as the courts struggled to resolve the
apparent incompatibility in light of past legislative intents, current
public policy and prevailing social conditions.
Nearly 10 years after Taft-Hartley became effective, the Supreme
83
Court took its first step toward the accommodation of the two acts.
Ironically, this initial section 301 action concerning a collective bar-

nor to economic stability and progress. It would be a dangerous stride in the direction of a totally managed economy. It contains seeds of discord which would plague
this Nation for years to come.
Id. (quoting the President's Message on Veto of Taft-Hartley Bill (June 20, 1947), 20 LRRM 22
(1947)).
71 Taft-Hartley § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
78 Mosuus, supra note 35, at 39. Because labor unions worked so vigorously to prevent
passage of Taft-Hartley, rather than working toward compromises, the labor movement had
little impact on the substance of the legislation. Id. at 45.
79 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 453-54 (1957); MoRRIs, supra
note 35, at 443. Thus, collective bargaining agreements would impact equally on both labor and
management. 353 U.S. at 454. But cf. Gregory, The Law of the Collective Agreement, 57
MICH. L. Rav. 635, 637 (1959) (motivations for Taft-Hartley were myriad, and "congress was
not entirely sure what it meant in section 301").
80 Taft-Hartley § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976). The words "collective bargaining agreement" appear nowhere in the Taft-Hartley amendments. Gregory, supra note 79, at 637.
" Comment, Prospective Injunctions and Federal Labor Law Policy: Of Future Strikes,
Arbitration, and Equity, 52 NOTRE DAME LAw. 307, 308 (1976).
Taft-Hartley does explicitly repeal another section of Norris-LaGuardia pertaining to liability of union officers, Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 204 (1962). Had Congress
intended to repeal the anti-injunction provisions also, it could have affected that intent in a like
manner. Id.
82 Perhaps President Truman's comments concerning "seeds of discord made upon passage"
of the Taft-Hartley amendments have been borne out by history. See note 76 supra.
83 Rains, Boys' Market Injunctions: Strict Scrutiny of the Presumption of Arbitrability, 28
LAB. L.J. 30, 30-31 (1977). Professor Gregory felt that "nobody took it very seriously." Gregory,
supra note 79, at 637.
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481

gaining agreement before the high court was a union suit to compel
an employer to comply with contractual grievance/arbitration procedures.8 4 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills 85 established that
section 301 was more than mere jurisdictional grant to federal
courts.8 6 The federal judiciary was to sculpt a substantive federal
labor law aimed at enforcement of collective bargaining agreements,
with emphasis on specific performance of arbitration provisions.8 7 The
formation of this corpus would challenge judicial creativity; remedies
were to be developed that reflected the purpose and policy of congressional legislation.88
Justice Douglas detailed the Taft-Hartley intent to favor collective bargaining agreements with no-strike provisions, citing the resultant industrial stability.8 9 Because an agreement to arbitrate was the
usual return promise for a no-strike clause, federal labor policy would
also favor and enforce arbitration compacts. 90 The "stiff procedural
requirements" 91 mandated by Norris-LaGuardia section 7 did not
apply to an injunction to compel arbitration because the refusal to
arbitrate was not an abuse that Norris-LaGuardia sought to prevent. 92 Therefore, an injunction could issue in a labor dispute of this

84 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 449. The agreement contained no-

strike and grievance/arbitration clauses. Id. The controversies, involving workloads and work
assignments, passed through the grievance procedure without resolution. Id. Arbitration, which
could have been requested by either party at that point, was proffered by the union; the
employer declined. Id. The union then brought suit to compel arbitration. Id. The district court
granted relief, the court of appeals overruled due to lack of jurisdiction. Id.
85 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
8a id. at 451.
87

Id.

8 Id.

at 457. The judiciary was exhorted to utilize not only federal legislation and compati-

ble state legislation, but also "the penumbra of express statutory mandates." Id.
Justice Douglas dismissed any constitutional difficulties. Id. The commerce clause clearly
gave Congress power to legislate concerning labor-management controversies. Id. Article III.
section 2 of the Constitution enlarged judicial authority to "cases 'arising under . . . the Laws of
the United States .... .' " Id. By Taft-Hartley section 301(a), Congress enacted federal law which

the courts were to adjudicate under Article III, section 2. Id. "It [was] not uncommon for
federal courts to fashion federal law where federal rights [were] concerned." Id.
89 Id. at 453-54.
90 Id. at 455.
91 Id. at 458.
92 Id.; Note, supra note 73, at 792. Section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia listed specific protected
activity. Id. Refusal to arbitrate was not so listed. Id. The Lincoln-Mills court read Taft-Hartley
section 8 to confirm an inclination toward arbitration because it stated that any party seeking an
injunction must have previously availed itself of all reasonable means of settlement. 353 U.S. at
458. Cf. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 34, at 222-23 ("It is surely a fair requirement
that one who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of a court should prove that he has
exhausted all reasonable means for the peaceful settlement of a labor dispute.").
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type with no conflict with the anti-injunction or specificity provisos of'
Norris-LaGuardia.
Three years later, Justice Douglas expanded the Court's policy of
favoring arbitration provisions in his majority opinions in the Steelworkers Trilogy. 93 Section 301 was held to charge the federal courts
with the duty to discern a breach of promise to arbitrate and to enforce that promise. 94 Questionable situations were to be determined
so as to promote and encourage the arbitration process. 95 In United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., the Court held that
it would presume the parties' intention to arbitrate "[i]n the absence
of any express provision excluding a particular grievance from [the]
arbitration [process] ....96 The federal courts would enforce arbitration awards with particularity with no review of the substance of the
awards, unless the court determined that the award did not "draw
.. .its essence from the collective bargaining agreement." 9 7
The federal labor policy of favoring the arbitral process gained
further momentum in Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co. 9 8 The
Court first established the pre-emption of federal labor policy over
conflicting state laws or policies. 99 Potentially differing interpretations under state and federal systems would impede progress toward
the goal of peaceful contract negotiation and dispute settlement. 10 0

93 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Corp.,
363 U.S. 594 (1960).
"Warrior, 363 U.S. at 582.
9Id.
at 583. The parties' chosen arbitrators, rather than the courts', possessed the expertise
and sensitivity necessary to successful dispute settlement. Id. at 581-82, 596.
9 Id.
at 584. The presumption of arbitrability had a more salutary effect on conflict resolution than intricate judicial involvement in contract interpretation because the interpretation was
relegated to experts. id. at 585.
97 Id. at 597. Because the grievance procedure which preceded arbitration involved participation of the parties themselves, the grievance/arbitration process was actually part of the collective bargaining process. Id. at 578, 581. Even submission of "frivolous claims" could have a
"therapeutic" effect. Id. at 568. While the Trilogy widened the jurisdiction of the federal courts
in determining arbitrability, it narrowed the function of the federal courts in construing collective bargaining agreements. Comment, Collective Bargaining and the No-Strike Clause: The
Sinclair Refining Case, 15 MAINE L. REv. 93, 98 (1963).
98 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
99 Id. at 102. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962), had empowered
state courts to apply federal substantive labor law. Id. at 511. The question of proper procedure
when state law conflicted with federal law was not answered. Id. at 514.
100 369 U.S. at 102-03. As section 301 actions could be brought in any one of the states,
parties bargaining for a multi-state agreement could never be certain of the meanings of their
own words. Id. at 103. The possibility of dissimilar interpretations in various jurisdictions would
increase litigation, defeating the policy favoring peaceful settlement. Id. at 103-04.
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Yet the primary issue in Lucas Flour concerned the validity of a
strike to settle a conflict while the parties were contractually bound to
a grievance/arbitration procedure. 10 1 Though the agreement contained not a trace of a no-strike provision, the Court held that such
would be implied from the clause submitting all disputes to final and
binding arbitration. 10 2 "To [have held] otherwise would obviously
[have done] violence to accepted principles of traditional contract
law." 103 Permitting such a work action would have been tantamount
to allowing the parties to substitute "economic warfare" for the
bargained-for arbitration process.1 04
Lucas Flour affirmed a judgment for damages caused by the
strike, 10 5 but did not grapple with the question of whether an injunction could issue against such a work stoppage in progress or in futuro.
Federal labor policy favored both arbitration and no-strike agreements.1 0 6 Section 301 would indeed support an injunction to compel
arbitration. 10 7 But Lucas Flour left unasked and unanswered the
question of whether section 301 would support an injunction to enforce a no-strike clause.' 0 8
Three and a half months after Lucas Flour, the Supreme Court
replied to that question in the negative in Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Atkinson.109 Despite a no-strike clause and an arbitration provision,
the union had perpetrated nine work stoppages over a period of 19
months."10 All of these strikes allegedly emanated from arbitrable
disputes."' Sinclair sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin such
1 2
action in the future.

101Id. at 104.
Id. at 105.
369 U.S. at 105.
104 Id. This result would have clashed directly with the arbitration policy expressly favored in
the Steelworkers' Trilogy, 363 U.S. at 580-81. However, the Court was careful to state that this
no-strike clause would be implied only for those issues which the parties were explicitly bound
by contract to submit to arbitration. 369 U.S. at 106.
105 369 U.S. at 97.
I" Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 453-54. See notes 89 and 90 supra
and accompanying text.
107 353 U.S. at 458. See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
108 But for Norris-LaGuardia the enjoining of a strike in violation of a no-strike clause would
have been a logical extension of Lucas Flour. Note, supra note 73, at 793.
1- 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
1o Id. at 197.
102
103

1 Id.
112

Id.
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Justice Black, writing for the majority, literally construed
Norris-LaGuardia11 3 and upheld a union's right to strike notwith114
standing that the strike violated a collective bargaining agreement.
The Court rejected any accomodation argument, 1 5 reasoning
that there was in fact no conflict between section 4 of NorrisLaGuardia and section 301(a) of Taft-Hartley. 1 16 The juxtaposition of
the two indicated to the majority that an employer would be able to
obtain an order to compel arbitration, and would also be able to seek
a remedy in damages for the breach of a collective bargaining agreement, 117 but he would definitely not be able to obtain an injunction
to prevent a breach of that agreement if the action he sought to enjoin was protected by section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia.11 8 Sinclair reaffirmed the national labor policy supporting arbitration, but posited
that Congress had delineated the parameters of that support. 119 En0
joining a work stoppage was not within those limits.12
The strong dissent by Justice Brennan asserted that since both
acts did in fact co-exist, both should be given their "fullest possible
effect." 121 This was the essence of the duty that Congress relegated
to the courts with the passage of Taft-Hartley. 122 The Sinclair dissent, a vanguard of the majority opinion in Boys' Market,123 summarized the logistics of harmonizing the two acts: "Accommodation requires only that the anti-injunction policy of Norris-LaGuardia not
intrude into areas not vital to its ends, where injunctive relief is vital

113 370 U.S. at 199. The controversy sub judice was unquestionably a "labor dispute" within
the protection of Norris-LaGuardia section 4. Id. at 198-99.
114 Id. at 200.
115 Id. at 209.
116 Id. at 213-14. The Court rationalized that judicial forbearance from issuing injunctions

violating Norris-LaGuardia did not diminish judicial support of collective bargaining agreements
containing grievance/arbitration procedures. Id.
117

Id.

1s Id.Congress did not intend for Taft-Hartley to reinstall the federal judiciary in the injunction business. Id. See note 51 supra for a listing of activity protected by section 4.
119370 U.S. at 213.
120 Id. While affirming Lincoln Mills and its progeny, the Court distinguished them from the
Sinclair action. Id. at 212. The Lincoln Mills injunction was an order to arbitrate, and the
refusal to submit to arbitration was not protected by Norris-LaGuardia. Id. The majority perceived no nexus between enjoining peaceful strikes and encouraging arbitration. Id. at 213.
121 Id. at 216.

122 Id. at 223. The dissenters asserted that section 4 was not repealed because the consequences of a complete revocation of that broad section were unforeseeable. Id. Neither did
Congress wish to abrogate the basic salutary policies of Norris-LaGuardia. Id. Thus, the legislators left the ad hoc accommodation of Norris-LaGuardia and Taft-Hartley to the courts. Id.
123 Boys' Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
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to a purpose of § 301; it does not require unconditional surrender." 124
Eight years later, Justice Brennan authored the majority opinion
in Boys' Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, l2 5 the current basis of
federal judicial authority to enjoin work stoppages in certain limited
circumstances.12 6 The collective bargaining agreement underlying a
labor dispute must contain a mandatory arbitration provision, and the
injunction sought must be appropriate despite the prohibition of
Norris-LaGuardia.

1

27

The decision detailed factors relevant in determining the propriety of injunctive relief. 128 The district court must construe the
agreement to assure that it does indeed provide for the compulsory
arbitration process, and must order the employer to arbitrate as a
condition to the issuing of an injunction. 1 29 The court must then
examine the equities attendant to the relief sought, including the potential of continuing breaches and irreparable injury. 130 The final
step is a determination of which party will suffer the greater harm:
the employer from denial of relief, or the union from granting of relief. 131
In overruling Sinclair, the Supreme Court characterized that decision "as a significant departure from . .. [its] otherwise consistent"' 3 2 policies of favoring peaceful dispute settlement and ac-

commodating the various congressional sources of substantive labor
law. 133 These judicial policies reflected public policy in encouraging
private arbitration, 13 and Sinclair served only to defeat this
35
scheme. 1

124 370 U.S. at 225. Justice Brennan also expressed fear that employers would hesitate in the
future to bargain for a no-strike clause/arbitration package if those provisions were enforceable

against the employer but not the union. Id. at 227.
125 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
126 U.S. Steel Corp. v. UMW, 593 F.2d 201, 204-05 (3d Cir. 1979).
127 398 U.S. at 353-54.

128 Id. at 254. See also 370 U.S. at 228.
129398 U.S. at 254. Once the arbitration promise is discerned, the no-strike promise arises.
See notes 102-04 supra and accompanying text.
130 398 U.S. at 254.

131 Id.
132 Id. at 241.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. Congressional silence in the eight years after Sinclair was not viewed by the Boys'
Market Court as dispositive of approval of Sinclair. Id. at 242.
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The consistency and uniformity in national labor law deemed so
vital by Lincoln Mills 136 had been gravely threatened by the Sinclair
ruling in combination with a subsequent United States Supreme
Court case, Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, IAM. 13 7 The latter
Court sustained removal from state to federal court of an action seeking a labor injunction. 138 This resulted in total preclusion of equitable relief, because federal courts were so barred by Sinclair.139
While Congress had clearly intended that Taft-Hartley provide additional remedies as a supplement to state jurisdiction, the combination
of these two Supreme Court decisions was causing Taft-Hartley to
assert a narrowing effect.140 The Boys' Market overruling of Sinclair
vitiated this conflict because essentially the same remedies would be
available in either state or federal courts.' 4 1 Justice Brennan posited
that more than "isolated words" 142 were to be considered in interpreting legislation. 1 43 "[R]ather, consideration [had to] ... be given
to the total corpus of pertinent law and the policies that inspired
ostensibly inconsistent provisions." 144 The social conditions and federal judicial propensities that gave rise to the prohibitions of NorrisLaGuardia had changed greatly since 1932.145 Congressional attention
had shifted from protection of the young labor movement to enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. 1 4 6 However, a revision
of legislation had not accompanied that shift in attention, and the

136 353 U.S. at 457; see also notes 85-88 supra and accompanying text.
137 Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, IAM, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
138 390 U.S. at 560-61. The employer filed suit in state court to enforce no-strike and arbitration clauses in a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 558. The court granted an ex parte
injunction. Id. The union then moved for removal in the district court, which subsequently

dissolved the injunction. Id. at 559.
139 370 U.S. at 213-14. See note 118 supra and accompanying text. The issue of application
of Sinclair to state courts had never been adjudicated. 398 U.S. at 247.

140 398 U.S. at 245. This narrowing effect also conflicted with Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,
368 U.S. 502 (1962) (state courts to have concurrent jurisdiction under section 301 with federal
courts). If a state court were to issue an injunction for violation of a collective bargaining agreement, the labor group had merely to seek removal to a federal court for dissolution of the
injunctive relief. 398 U.S. at 246.

141 398 U.S. at 246-47. Equality of remedies would also have resulted from the extension of
Sinclair to the states. Id. However, the Boys' Market Court reasoned that since Congress had
given no indication that Norris-LaGuardia was to be applied to the states, the more efficient
judicial approach was the overruling of Sinclair. Id.
142 Id. at 250.

at 247.

143 Id.
I" Id.

145 Id. See notes 35-40 supra and accompanying text.
146 398 U.S. at 251.
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duty to accommodate conflicting statutes had devolved upon the federal
14 7
judiciary.
Two years later, the Supreme Court elaborated on the presumption of arbitrability as a basis for a Boys' Market injunction in Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW. 148 Public policy favoring peaceful dispute
settlement would operate to subject even a safety dispute to arbitration, 14 9 as long as the dispute did not concern "'an immediate
danger.' '15o Finding a duty to arbitrate, the Court issued equitable
relief to enjoin all work stoppages associated with the safety issue.151
The collective bargaining agreement must contain a mandatory
arbitration provision, and the precise issue generating an illegal strike
must clearly fall within that arbitration provision for an injunction to
issue against the strike. 152 The Supreme Court thus emphasized this
narrowness of the Boys' Market injunction in Bufalo Forge Co. v.
United Steelworkers. 153 Whether the sympathy strike in Buffalo
Forge violated the no-strike clause was a question for the arbitrator to
decide. 15 While the federal courts could compel the parties to arbitrate, they could not enjoin the strike pending the outcome of the
155
arbitral process.
The Boys' Market accommodation of section 4 of NorrisLaGuardia to section 301(a) of Taft-Hartley supported the legislative
preference for arbitration. 156 This sympathy strike did not concern
any arbitrable issue, and enjoining it would have directly controverted Norris-LaGuardia without furthering any national labor policy. 15 7 Such was not the goal of accommodation, and the majority of
this 5-4 split court held Boys' Market inapplicable.' 15
147

Id. See note 135 supra.

148 Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
149

414 U.S. at 379.

Id. at 384. A work stoppage solely for protection of employees from imminent peril is
protected by section 502 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 143. 414 U.S. at
385.
152 Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1976).
150

153

Id.

Id. at 411. The sympathy strike was not related to any issue subject to arbitration by
contract. Id. at 407.
155 Id. at 410. Such an action would deeply involve the courts in dispute settlement. Id. at
410-11. This involvement would conflict with the national policy favoring private settlement of
disputes, aided by the arbitrator's expertise. Id. For a further discussion of Buffalo Forge, see
Note, Sympathy Strike May Not Be Enjoined Pending Arbitration of its Legality Under the
No-Strike Clause of A Collective Bargaining Agreement, 8 SETON HALL L. REv. 89 (1976).
154

156

428 U.S. at 407.

157Id.
158 Id. The Court differentiated between a general anti-strike policy and a pro-arbitration
policy. Id. at 409. Section 301 relegated collective bargaining agreement enforcement to the
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As various district courts began to decide section 301 actions involving equitable remedies, it became apparent that the Boys' Market
parameters concerning the scope of prospective injunctions were not
sufficiently clear. 1 59 The Seventh Circuit affirmed a permanent injunction against "work stoppages and strikes resulting from any differences or local trouble which the parties are contractually obligated to
arbitrate under the terms of their . . . [a]greement." 160 A narrower
remedy was upheld in the Tenth Circuit. 16 1 This injunction
prohibited specified categories of concerted activity in reaction to disputes over particular arbitrable issues.16 2 On the pole opposite the
liberal Seventh Circuit stood the Fifth Circuit which held prospective
injunctions violative of specificity requirements of Norris-LaGuardia
section 9.163 Judge Wisdom reasoned also that the limits of Boys'
Market required that the specific issues underlying each strike be
adjudicated to ascertain arbitrability before any injunction could issue. 164

federal courts. Id. That enforcement, however, was limited to arbitration provisions. Id. The
violation of a no-strike clause per se was an insufficient basis for an injunction clashing with
protected rights under Norris-LaGuardia. Id.
159 Note, supra note 73, at 794. For a survey of Boys' Market injunctions in the circuits, see
Rains, supra note 83, 38-42.
160 Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Local 1487, UMW, 500 F.2d 950, 951 (7th Cir. 1974) (Old
Ben II). This injunction, responsive to a long series of wildcat strikes, was phrased as
broadly as the contractual arbitration clause. Id. at 953. The court declared that the extent of
the misconduct should determine the scope of the injunction. Id. Old Ben Coal Corp. had
suffered heavy and unrecoverable losses as a result of this pattern of strikes. Id. The court
of appeals held this broad relief to be the only suitable solution to these critical controversies in
the coal field areas. Id. The union could hardly claim vagueness, the court reasoned, as the
injunction was phrased in the very language the parties had bargained for in their agreement.
Id.
See also Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Local 1487, UMW, 457 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1972), in which
the same court limited the injunction to the specific issue before the court, but intimated that if
there was not adequate compliance to the narrow injunction, a broader one could issue. Id. at
165.
161 CF & I Steel Corp. v. UMW, 507 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1974).
162 Id. at 173. The trial court found that certain controversial issues had given rise to a
continuing pattern of illegal union conduct. Id. at 172. The court of appeals upheld the injunctive prohibition against " 'strike, work stoppage, interruption of work, or picketing ... over
disputes arising from employee suspensions, employee discharges and work assignments .
Id. at 173.
163 U.S. Steel Corp. v. UMW, 519 F.2d 1236, 1245 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S.
910 (1976). See notes 54-56 supra and accompanying text.
1" 519 F.2d at 1245. Judge Wisdom held additionally that the prospective injunction was
invalidated by Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d) which states:
Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the
reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts
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The Third Circuit followed an intermediate approach in U.S.
Steel Corp. v. UMW, 1 65 where it sought to harmonize NorrisLaGuardia and Taft-Hartley in the context of a prospective Boys'
Market injunction. 166 Clearly section 301 empowered federal courts
to construe collective bargaining agreements. 16 7 Once a plaintiff
pleaded and proved that a defendant had "engag[ed] in a pattern of
conduct . . . [involving] repeated and similar violations," 168 the
courts should not be burdened with repetitive litigation over the
same issue. 169 In this majority opinion, Judge Gibbons agreed with
Judge Wisdom that the arbitrability of an issue underlying the work
stoppage must be adjudicated on a case-by-case basis. 170 However,
once a particular issue had been litigated, "a remedial injunction
[could] . . . encompass a pattern of ongoing activity." 171
U.S. Steel elaborated on the specificity necessary to validate a
prospective injunction. The relief must be closely related to the evidence presented at the adversary proceeding, curtailing no more activity than necessary to abate the illegal actions. 17 2 The responsibilities of each party enjoined must be displayed in detail to avoid
173
the blanket injunction approach of the pre-Norris-LaGuardia era.
The tripartite holding in BCOA v. UMW illustrated the disposition of requests for both an overly broad 174 and a properly phrased
prospective injunction. 175 The third section of Judge Gibbons' opinion, which dealt with declaratory judgment as a remedy in a section

sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the parties to the action, their
officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by
personal service or otherwise.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d) (1976); 519 F.2d at 1246.
165 U.S. Steel Corp. v. UMW, 534 F.2d 1063 (3d Cir. 1976). This opinion examined the
collective bargaining agreement that succeeded the contract involved in Old Ben II, CF & I
Steel, and the Fifth Circuit's U.S. Steel. Id. at 1076. This agreement is also the contract that is

the subject of the note case.
166 Id. at 1077.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. Factors to be considered are past behavior, probability of repetition, and the role that
each defendant has or would play in such past or future actions. Id.
173 Id. at 1077-78. This detailed account would preclude violation of Rule 65(d). Id. See note
164 supra.
174 585 F.2d at 592-94. See notes 183-84 infra and accompanying text.

175 585 F.2d at 597-99. See notes 195-205 infra and accompanying text.
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301 proceeding, 176 was a fine example of the "judicial inventiveness"
mandated in Lincoln Mills. 1 77 The BCOA quest for injunctive relief 1 78 failed to meet both the arbitrability requirement of Boys'
Market/Gateway Coal and the specificity requirement of NorrisLaGuardia and U.S. Steel. 179 BCOA sought to compel a vigorous
undertaking by the International to encourage contract compliance at
the local level. 18 0
Both parties agreed that the issue was not within the grievance/
arbitration provision of the Agreement,' 8 ' as disputes "national in
character" were not subject to arbitration.' 18 2 BCOA contended,
however, that the Boys' Market requirement of arbitrability was not
relevant to the owners' claims because the requested injunction
would restrain neither picketing nor work stoppages. 183 The court
disagreed with this analysis on two grounds. The indoctrination of
members by the International arguably had a propensity to violate
section 4(i) which protected even the inducement to conduct picketing or strikes.' 8 4 More importantly, the ultimate result desired,
abatement of strikes and picketing, was definitely prohibited by section 4(a) and (e). 18 5 When an injunction sought such objectives, the
prohibitions of section 4 applied, and the arbitrability requirement of
18 6
Boys' Market must be met.
Even were the underlying dispute arbitrable, the prospective injunction requested would not have fulfilled the specificity requirements of Norris-LaGuardia section 9.187 Norris-LaGuardia precluded

176 585 F.2d at 594-97. See notes 206-29 infra and accompanying text.
177 353 U.S. at 457.
178 585 F.2d at 590. Some of the actions sought were instruction and discipline of members,

refusal to defend any party encouraging or engaging in illegal activity, suspension of uncooperative subordinate unions, and condemnation of roving picketing. 431 F. Supp. at 777-78. The
relief requested was to use "any and all reasonable means at its command." Id. at 777.
179 585 F.2d at 594.
180 See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
181 585 F.2d at 593.
182 Id. at 589. These national disputes were to be settled by the collective bargaining procedure. Id. These issues could not be presumed arbitrable under Steelworkers' Trilogy because
the contract expressly excluded them from the arbitration provision. See note 96 supra and
accompanying text.
183 585 F.2d at 593. Norris-LaGuardia section 4(a) and (e) protect these activities. See notes
51-52 supra and accompanying text.
'" 585 F.2d at 593-94. See notes 51 and 53 supra and accompanying text.
185 585 F.2d at 594.
'86 Id. In some instances a section 301 injunction against activity only collateral to arbitrable
controversies could issue, but only if the activity were not protected by section 4(a)-(1). Id.
187 Id. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
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the issuance of a broadly phrased injunction. 18 8 U.S. Steel declared
the "re-litigation exception" to the interdict of section 9,189 which
required a full hearing judging the conduct in question violative of
the labor contract. 190 If a prospective injunction issued from such a
hearing, that charge could forbid only repeated actions similar to the
conduct previously adjudicated. 19 1 The charge sought did not fall
within the purview of the re-litigation exception because it was overly
general in its scope. 1 92 The mine owners desired to enjoin and compel actions referenced in the broadest of terms; 193 and this overbreadth forced the court to affirm the district court's conclusion
that
94
there was no claim upon which that relief could be granted.
The defects that vitiated BCOA's claim did not plague the individual mine owners' request for a prospective injunction.1 95 Though
the wording of the claims was similar, the litigation underlying each
was clearly distinguishable. The individual mines presented evidence
relating to specific work stoppages at specific locations arising out of
issues which were clearly arbitrable.19 6 The owners sought to enjoin
future action of the same type.1 97 Because the underlying issue was
within the mandatorv arbitration clause, the injunction pursued was
within the Boys' Market exception. 19
Section 4 could not pose an
absolute bar to relief.199
The owners' request was also very close to fulfilling the twotiered test of U.S. Steel. 200 The union's past actions had been adjudicated in violation of the Agreement. 20 1 In addition, the

1"

585 F.2d at 594. See note 178 supra.

189 585 F.2d at 594. See notes 167-73 supra and accompanying text.
190 534 F.2d at 1077. See notes 172-73 supra and accompanying text.
191 534 F.2d at 1077.
192 585 F.2d at 594. See note 178 supra.
193 See 431 F. Supp. at 777-78. See also note 178 supra. The breadth of this requested relief
would also cause it to conflict with Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 585 F.2d
at 594. See note 164 supra and accompanying text.
194 585 F.2d at 594. See note 24 supra and accompanying text. The complaints of BCOA and
the individual mine owners were consolidated in district court and appealed as one case. 585
F.2d at 589.
195 585 F.2d at 599. See Consolidation Coal Co. v. International, UMW, 431 F. Supp. at
789-91 (1977) for the full text of relief sought. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
196 585 F.2d at 598. See note 24 supra. Disputes local in nature were within the scope of the
mandatory arbitration clause. 585 F.2d at 589.
197 585 F.2d at 589.
198 Id. at 598. In order to pursue the national policy favoring arbitration, the Boys' Market
exception evolved as a means of accommodating section 4 to section 301.
199 Id. See notes 142-47 supra and accompanying text.
200 585 F.2d at 598-99. See notes 170-71 supra and accompanying text.
201 585 F.2d at 598.
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employer group had established that the actions it sought to enjoin in
the future were repetitive and similar in type and location to the acts
previously adjudicated. 202 The only question remaining was whether
or not the injunction could be drawn with sufficient specificity to
avoid running afoul of section 9 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
65(d). 20 3 The Bituminous Coal court asserted that such a drafting
was within the realm of possibility 2 04 and remanded the issue to the
20 5
district court for appropriate consideration.
BCOA had also asserted a claim for a declaratory judgment that
certain past conduct of the International during wildcat strikes had
breached the Agreement. 20 6 Judge Gibbons initiated his analysis by
examining the applicability of traditional grounds for refusal of such
relief. 20 7 He ascertained that BCOA was not seeking the judgment
in lieu of some other proscribed remedy and that the court's judgment would neither usurp the decisional authority of some other
20 8
body nor erode the arbitration process.
The International urged that declaratory relief be declined because that remedy would have the same effect as an injunction
phrased in the broad terms of the contract. 20 9 In refuting this contention, the court particularized the effect of a declaratory judgment.
While an injunction mandated immediate compliance on pain of contempt, a declaratory decree merely circumscribed certain rights and
obligations of the parties, or breaches thereof. 210 Should subsequent
relief be necessary, that relief could be granted only " 'after reasonable notice and hearing .....
211
Thus the declaratory judgment

202

Id.

203 Id. at 599. The district court had refused to grant the injunction, positing that the language could not be made sufficiently specific. 431 F. Supp. at 783.
204 585 F.2d at 599. The decree had to be limited to anticipated recurrences of the actions
judged to be violations of the Agreement and had to enumerate specific steps to be taken to
prevent the recurrences. Id.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 595.

207 Id. at 594. The resolution of this dispute was not contractually relegated to an arbitral
forum, nor was it within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board or a
sovereign state. Id. at 594-95.
208 Id. at 595. The Steelworkers' Trilogy had expressly stated that the judiciary's intervention

in arbitrable disputes was to be limited to the determination that the dispute was in fact subject
to the arbitration process. 363 U.S. at 596-97. To become involved in the settlement process
would have defeated the national policy of favoring private resolution of labor controversies. id.
See notes 94-97 supra and accompanying text.
209 585 F.2d at 596.
210 ld. at 595.

211 Id. at 596. The Declaratory Judgments Act states in pertinent part:
Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may
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averted the "judgment preclusion" 21 2 effect of an injunction, because
additional proceedings had to ensue before equitable relief would
213
issue against an adverse party.
The International also contended that Norris-LaGuardia
prohibited declaratory as well as injunctive remedies.2 1 4 The court,
however, was not receptive to this argument.2 15 In 1932, when
Congress enacted Norris-LaGuardia, declaratory decrees did not issue
from federal courts; 216 the Declaratory Judgments Act was not passed
until two years later.2 17 Congress could not have intended to prohibit a non-existent remedy. 2 18 Moreover, when the Declaratory
Judgments Act was passed in 1934, there was no mention of exclud2 19
ing labor disputes.
A declaratory decree in this labor dispute, the court asserted,
possessed numerous advantages. 2 2 0 Such a remedy would apprise
the parties of their mutual obligations under the Agreement. 2 2 1 Because the judgment would concern an interpretation of the Agreement, other signatories to the contract could also rely on the holding,
and multiple litigation could be avoided. 2 2 2 Lastly, because
declaratory relief was issued before actions occurred which might re-

be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse party whose
rights have been determined by such judgment.
28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1976).
212 585 F.2d at 596. The issuance of an injunction estops the parties from seeking a subsequent judgment on that same point. Id.
213 Id. Judge Gibbons analogizes the judgment preclusion of declaratory relief to the judgment preclusion of a monetary judgment, utilizing the example of Republic Steel Corp. v.
UMW, 570 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1978). Id. In that case the Third Circuit reversed a summary
judgment against the International, asserting that the International may have been liable for
damages incurred by Republic Steel during wildcat strikes in August 1975 and January 1976.
570 F.2d at 469, 480. The declaration of contractual liability can form a basis for actions against
the International by other signatories of that same industry-wide contract, because the International would be estopped from re-litigating a previously adjudicated issue. 585 F.2d at 596.
With liability declared, a subsequent hearing would concern only damages resulting from a
similar activity. Id.
214 585 F.2d at 595.
215

Id.

216Id.
217 28 U.S.C. § 2201, Historical and Revision Notes-1948 Act (1976).
218 585 F.2d at 595.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 595, 596.
221 Id. at 595. Each party contended that it had not violated the Agreement. Id. BCOA
charged that the International breached obligations to enforce its promises in the contract. Id.
The International asserted that it had never undertaken the charged obligations. Id.

222

Id. at 596.
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sult in injury, it was superior to relief in the form of a damages judg223
ment.
The final UMW contention asserted that the district court's denial of a declaratory judgment was a matter of discretion and should
thus be affirmed. 22 4 The court of appeals agreed that the action was
discretionary, but posited that the discretion should be a "reasoned
discretion." 225 Because the lower court had treated the request for
declaratory relief as a request for injunctive relief, it had not applied
the proper standards for determining the propriety of a declaratory
decree. 22 6 The court of appeals remanded this issue to the district
court for suitable consideration. 2 27
In summary, Judge Gibbons commented that the declaratory
judgment should be generally available in labor disputes when the
parties have not committed contract interpretation to the arbitration
process. 228 The accessibility of this remedy would greatly diminish
the propensity toward self-help to "solve" the conflict and would decrease the concomitant potential for violence and damages. 22 9
The denial of the broad injunction against International 23 0 was
dispositive of the Third Circuit's intent to honor the parameters of
due process and past Supreme Court decisions. 23 1 The court
examined the actual intent of the injunction sought and applied the
proper law. 23 2 Lack of arbitrability precluded the Boys' Market exception to Norris-LaGuardia section 4, and lack of specificity precluded the U.S. Steel exception to Norris-LaGuardia section 9.233

223

Id.

Id. The Declaratory Judgments Act states: "[Any court of the United States . . . may
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration
....
28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976).
224

225 585 F.2d at 596.

226 Id. at 596-97. The factors to be considered are:
(1) the likelihood that the declaration will resolve the uncertainty of obligation
which gave rise to the controversy;
(2) the convenience of the parties;
(3) the public interest in a settlement of the uncertainty of obligation; and
(4) the availability and relative convenience of other remedies.

Id.
227 Id. at 597.
228 Id. at 596.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 592. See notes 184-94 supra and accompanying text.
231 585 F.2d at 592-93.
232 Id. at 594.
233 Id. at 592-94.

19791

NOTES

The individual mine owners' request, however, did fulfill the requirements for a prospective injunction in a labor dispute. 2 34 The
work stoppages at the local mines were clearly within the arbitration
provision, and the evidence presented was sufficient to establish both
a breach of contract and a pattern of ongoing activity.2 35 Even with
these criteria met, the court continued to be concerned with the
specificity of the injunction to be issued and emphasized that factor
236
upon remand.
The most significant impact of Bituminous Coal emanated from
the third segment of the triple holding. The use of declaratory relief
was a novel approach to collective bargaining agreement enforcement. 2 3 7 As the declaratory judgment was not conditioned on
arbitrability, contract promises excepted from arbitration were fair
subject matter.2 3 8 The strict provisos of Norris-LaGuardia were not
applicable because Norris-LaGuardia was not concerned with limiting
declaratory relief against labor unions.2 3 9 In addition, the protections of Norris-La Guardia were intended primarily to shelter organizational strike activities or work stoppages occurring at contract expiration. The wildcat strike falls into neither classification.
Due process was guaranteed by the Declaratory Judgments Act itself.2 4 0 Section 301 apparently intended to include this remedy
when it relegated enforcement of collective bargaining agreements to
the federal courts.2 4 1 In addition, the declaration lacked the harsh242
ness of an injunction with its accompanying contempt sanctions.
What will occur if an adverse party does not heed a declaratory
decree concerning its contractual undertakings and continues to engage in the adjudicated misconduct? The precise answer will surely
be forthcoming when the district court of western Pennsylvania commences issuing declaratory relief. However, certain irresistible speculations arise when one juxtaposes U.S. Steel and Bituminous Coal. A
district court can issue a declaratory judgment on the mutual obligations of parties to a contract, if the underlying dispute is not subject

Id.
585
236 Id.
237 See
238 585

at 598-99. See notes 195-205 supra and accompanying text.
F.2d at 598.
at 599.
id. at 596. See notes 206-29 supra and accompanying text.
F.2d at 594. Had the issue been contractually committed to the arbitral forum, a
declaratory judgment would be precluded. Id.
239 Id. at 595.
234

235

240
141
242

28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1976).
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 455-56 (citing 93 CoNG. RPEc. 3656-57).
585 F.2d at 596.
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to arbitration.2 43 If there is no subsequent compliance to the decree,
the parties may apply to the district court for enforcement under section 2202 of the Declaratory Judgments Act. 244 Should an injunction
issue from that second hearing, it could be applied to the adverse
party's future conduct by utilizing the U.S. Steel relitigation exception
24 5
to Norris-LaGuardia.
Peaceful dispute settlement is not only the heart of American
labor policy but is an absolute mandate of highly industrialized
American industry. 2 46 Harmonious resolution of controversies should
be demanded not only in disputes subject to arbitration but also in
disputes over non-arbitrable contractual undertakings. 24 7 The coal
industry's wildcat strikes consume much of the nation's time and resources. 248 To enable the federal courts to command cooperation
from the UMW International could have only a salutary effect upon
the labor-management relations involved. 24 9 Reduced tensions
between these parties would favorably impact the relevant public interests.
Boys' Market created an exception to Norris-LaGuardia in order
to support the policy of favoring arbitration. 25 0 Bituminous Coal
combined the Declaratory Judgments Act, Taft-Hartley section 301,
and U.S. Steel to potentially create an additional exception to
Norris-LaGuardia to support the policy of favoring peaceful dispute
settlement. The pre-Norris-LaGuardia abuses of labor unions have
disappeared. The Third Circuit has apparently recognized that reality
and directed its energy to fulfilling its Taft-Hartley section 301 obligation to enforce promises exchanged during the collective bargaining
process.
Deanne Wilson Plank

243 Id.
244

Id.

at 594, 597.
at 596; 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1976).

534 F.2d at 1077.
Republic Steel Corp. v. UMW, 570 F.2d at 473-74.
247 585 F.2d at 595.
248 Id. at 590. The litigation alone is staggering. From January 1, 1972 to December 21,
1977, over 300 cases naming UMW as defendant were brought in the district court for the
western district of Pennsylvania. 570 F.2d at 480 n.18. See notes 12-15 supra and accompany245
246

ing text.
249 570 F.2d at 479. Because the coal miners regard themselves as members of the International rather than the district or local unions, the International may be held in a position of
respected leadership. Id.
250 398 U.S. at 251.

